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Introduction
The A¤ordable Care Act (ACA) has been the most far-reaching health insurance reform for people under 65 in U.S. history, and as health insurance in the U.S. is predominantly provided by employers, it has been expected to have substantial e¤ects on the labor market. Supporters of the law claimed that by limiting the extent of adverse selection in the nongroup market, the ACA will also alleviate the problem of job lock -the fact that people seek to be in jobs that o¤er health insurance even if they don't have a comparative advantage for them -and make labor markets more e¢ cent. Opponents of the law argued that the structure of the insurance subsidies envisioned by the law created disincentives to work, while the ACA's mandate on medium-sized employers to provide insurance to full-time workers or pay a …ne created a bias against hiring and encouraged the substitution of full-time workers by part-time workers. The particularly slow labor market recovery following the Great Recession lent plausibility to the claims of the critics of the ACA that the expectation of its regulations was hindering job creation (Jacobs 2013) .
In this paper, I will assess evidence on the e¤ects of the ACA on the labor market by comparing places that were expected to be a¤ected by the ACA substantially -places with a large fraction of people who were uninsured before the law -with places that the ACA was expected to a¤ect less. For example, Texas, with 25% of people uninsured, should have experienced a much larger e¤ect on its labor market from the ACA than Minnesota, with only 9.5% uninsured. It goes without saying that places with di¤erent uninsurance rates di¤er in much more than exposure to the ACA. Therefore, instead of comparing the labor markets in Texas and Minnesota directly, I will compare changes in employment in Texas and Minnesota around the last quarter of 2013, in which the ACA began to be implemented, to each other as well as to how employment was changing in both Texas and Minnesota before the implementation of the ACA. I will also perform the same comparison for the year 2010, in which the ACA was enacted but not yet implemented, to see whether the anticipation e¤ects of the ACA could have di¤erentially a¤ected the recovery of di¤erent places from the Great Recession. The essential question in this paper is whether the di¤erential between the labor market experiences in Texas and in Minnesota continued roughly along the same trend after 2010 (and after the end of 2013) as it did before, or whether after the enactment and the implementation of the A¤ordable Care Act, the labor market paths of these places took a di¤erent turn.
Looking at U.S. counties in 2013 and 2014, I …nd that, if anything, employment rose in the counties that were more exposed to the ACA relative to the less exposed counties. The magnitude of this rise, however, was moderate, at the level of around a tenth of the within-county standard deviation of employment estimated between 2012 and 2013. On the other hand, I …nd that the change in employment was not homogeneous across industries. While the inference is not precise, the point estimates indicate that more exposed counties 1 experienced a large rise in employment in industries with a low propensity to o¤er insurance to workers, but virtually no rise in employment in industries with a high propensity to o¤er insurance to workers relative to less-exposed counties. I similarly …nd that salaries rose more on average in more exposed counties, with the average masking a relative salary decline in low-insurance industries and a larger salary rise in high-insurance industries. Hence, the di¤erential labor market patterns are consistent with an increase in the relative supply of workers in low-insurance industries, which is consistent with some alleviation of job lock by the ACA.
Coming back to the comparison of Texas and Minnesota, I show that the main result of this paper holds for the speci…c comparison of these two di¤erent states in Figure 1 . I plot total year-on-year employment growth rates in Texas and Minnesota from Q1 of 2012 to Q4 of 2014. Since employment grows faster in Texas in every quarter than it does in Minnesota, I plot the series using di¤erent y-axes to make the numbers more comparable. We see that before Q4 2013, in which the ACA began to be implemented, employment growth in Minnesota was steady, while employment growth in Texas was declining. However, after this period, with the ACA implemented, employment growth in Minnesota declines slightly, while employment growth in Texas rises substantially. Since Texas has a much higher fraction of people who are uninsured than Minnesota does, and therefore, should be much more a¤ected by the ACA, the fact that Texas and Minnesota employment growth rates diverge faster after the implementation of the ACA in Q4 2013 than they diverged before the implementation of the ACA is inconsistent with the idea that the ACA harmed employment growth.
I can exploit an additional source of variation based on the 2012 Supreme Court decision that allowed states not to implement the expansion of Medicaid foreseen by the ACA. Since the Medicaid expansion was implemented in January 2014 in some states but not in others, I can look at how employment outcomes changed di¤erentially across pairs of bordering counties in which one county belongs to a state that expanded Medicaid and the other county belongs to a state that did not. I …nd that Medicaid expansion likewise did not decrease, and likely increased employment in a¤ected counties relative to their prior trend.
It could have been the case that while there was little negative impact of the ACA at its implementation, the anticipation of the ACA between 2010 and 2014 could have a¤ected the pace of the recovery from the Great Recession. To assess this hypothesis, I consider changes in employment for U.S. counties during the recession and recovery period centered on 2010. I …nd that counties that had higher uninsurance rates in 2010, if anything, grew faster after 2010 relative to their trend than did counties with lower uninsurance rates. Looking at state variation in part-time employment rates, I also show that more exposed states experienced a statistically insigni…cant decline in their part-time to full-time ratio. Hence, it appears very unlikely that the ACA substantially reduced employment in the areas that could expect to be most a¤ected by it.
Supporters of the ACA have claimed that the anticipation of the reform has led providers and insurers to moderate the growth of health care expenditures for consumers, while critics have argued instead that the ACA will increase health insurance premiums through mandating more comprehensive insurance. I consider the possible anticipation e¤ects of the ACA on the market for employer-based health insurance. I …nd that in the more exposed states, the average premium shows a small and statistically insigni…cant decline. However, the distribution of premiums experienced a compression relative to the less exposed states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional structure and the related literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical approach. Section 5 presents the estimates for the 2014 implementation of the ACA. Section 6 presents the estimates for the 2010 enactment of the ACA. Section 7 concludes.
Background
Adverse selection has historically been a major problem in health insurance markets because patients tend to have much more information about their propensity to utilize medical resources than they can credibly reveal to insurers. Therefore, health insurance markets in the U.S. have functioned well only in the context of large businesses buying insurance for their employees, who would then constitute a large pool that is randomly selected from the point of view of health. The individual and small group insurance market -used by people who are not employed, self-employed, or employees of small …rms -sees relatively low premiums for healthy individuals and groups, but outright denial of coverage for individuals and groups who have a high risk of substantial medical expenditures. The fact that people with high risk cannot purchase insurance at a price that is close to being actuarially fair, and the fact that insurance …rms compete on attracting the best risks instead of on being the best at managing risks, indicates an information failure in the nongroup market and represents substantial welfare loss (Hendren 2013 ).
The approach of the ACA in solving this problem is threefold. First, insurance …rms are now forbidden from denying insurance or increasing premiums based on health status -premiums can now vary only based on features of the plan, and the age and tobacco use of the policyholder. Second, everyone is obligated to buy and hold a health insurance policy in order to prevent people from buying insurance only when they are sick and thus bankrupting the insurers. Finally, to make sure that poor households and …rms have a¤ordable insurance options, the government o¤ers a subsidy to buying insurance, which phases out as the income of the policyholder grows. In addition to these three core components, the ACA includes other provisions that may impact the labor market. First, insurance …rms are required to include certain "essential health bene…ts" in any insurance plan that they o¤er, which makes it di¢ cult for them to attract low-risk consumers by o¤ering very inexpensive bare-bones plans. However, the additional mandated bene…ts make health insurance more expensive, which a¤ects the labor costs of companies that o¤er health insurance. Second, the ACA imposes a mandate on medium-sized and large …rms (50 full-time equivalent employees or more) to purchase insurance for their employees or to pay a …ne. This …ne is calculated as $2000 for each full-time employee that the …rm fails to cover minus 30, as long as the …rm has at least 50 full-time equivalent employees. The rationale for this …ne is that …rms with market power and employing workers who are eligible for the ACA insurance subsidies may stop o¤ering their workers health insurance and have them purchase it using the subsidies, thus e¤ectively transferring some of the …rm's labor costs to the taxpayer. The fact that this formula depends on the number of full-time workers creates an incentive for …rms that may pay the …ne to substitute part-time workers for full-time workers, and thus, make it more di¢ cult for people to …nd full-time work. Mulligan (2013) estimates that because the ACA increases marginal tax rates (through o¤ering subsidies that are phased out and through expanding Medicaid) and incentivizes part-time employment relative to full employment, it could lead to declines in both employment and GDP for the economy.
However, some of the ACA's e¤ects on the labor market may actually be e¢ ciency-improving. The fact that nongroup health insurance markets work poorly creates an incentive for people to work in …rms that o¤er insurance, and thus distorts the allocation of labor away from what it should be under the principles of comparative advantage. This phenomenon, known as job lock, has been found to be large in U.S. labor markets (Madrian 1994, Gruber and Madrian 2004) . By creating viable nongroup markets, the ACA reduces this distortion and encourages workers to move away from …rms that o¤er them insurance and toward …rms in which their productivity (or their utility from other amenities, such as a more interesting job or more ‡exible hours) is higher. A speci…c form of job lock, known as employment lock, could result if some people would be better o¤ outside of the labor force (for instance, by living on the income of another household member, on government assistance or on private savings) but nevertheless remain employed in order to obtain health insurance. In particular, Garthwaite, Gross and Notowidigdo (2014) show that a decrease in labor force participation may be an e¢ ciency-enhancing result of insurance expansion, and the CBO (2014) concludes that the ACA will result in a modest decline in employment for this reason.
Data
The key independent variable in this analysis is the fraction of people under 65 and earning less than Prior county uninsurance rates are related to the impact of the ACA on the labor market in multiple ways. First, ex ante uninsurance is a measure of how di¢ cult it is to …nd insurance on the nongroup market in a locality. Second, it is associated with how frequently do …rms o¤er insurance to their employees. In a county in which all …rms o¤er insurance, the ACA should bind only weakly (by a¤ecting entrants, for example), while in a county where no …rms o¤er insurance, the ACA will compel a major reorganization of the existing employee bene…ts structures. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, prior uninsurance rates will be associated with the number of people who could conceivably choose to use exchange subsidies or who will become eligible for Medicaid. These people will see their labor supply incentives a¤ected by the fact that the Medicaid eligibility and the subsidies will gradually phase out as they earn more income.
In the course of the analysis, it will be important to control for the di¤erential recovery paths of di¤erent counties from the Great Recession. To do so, I will use data on county unemployment in 2010 (shortly after the trough of the recession) in the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS).
In order to assess possible e¤ects of the ACA on labor markets, I look at variation in employment and wages across counties, years and industries in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).
I also look at gross state product per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as well as ratios of part-time employment to full-time employment computed from the CPS. Additionally, I consider state and year-level data from the MEPS (Insurance Component) on the distribution of employer-provided insurance premiums (the average and the 90-10 percentile ratio).
4 Empirical Approach
It is obvious that places with di¤ering exposure to the ACA will also di¤er along other dimensions. States with higher uninsurance may have stricter standards for Medicaid eligibility and may be more conservative economically. They may also have a di¤erent industrial structure, with a greater reliance on low-insurance industries like leisure and hospitality. Hence, it is insu¢ cient to simply compare more exposed to less exposed areas before and after the passage of the ACA in 2010 or its implementation in 2014. Instead, I allow labor market di¤erences between more and less exposed areas to evolve ‡exibly over time and look for breaks in this evolution at the passage and implementation of the ACA.
To investigate the impact of the implementation of the ACA in late 2013, I run the following regression:
where y c;t is the outcome of interest (for example, log employment), c is a county …xed e¤ect, t is a year-quarter …xed e¤ect, t is another year-quarter …xed e¤ect, U 
In my analysis of the implementation of the ACA in 2014, I also estimate a speci…cation in which I compare outcomes within pairs of bordering counties in which one county experiences a Medicaid expansion and the other one does not. The regression then becomes
where M c;t is an indicator for whether Medicaid was expanded in county c and at time t, b (c) is the county pair that includes county c, and b(c);t is a county-pair-time …xed e¤ect.
5 Results for Implementation of the ACA in 2014 Table I are at quarterly frequency, a concern may be that the results are a¤ected by purely seasonal e¤ects. To avoid this concern, I convert all dependent variables to year-on-year logarithmic di¤erences. As the dependent variables are then all in logarithmic form, I multiply all coe¢ cients and standard errors by 100 to get the percentage point change in the relevant dependent variable that is associated with each trend break. For every dependent variable, I also present its within-county standard deviation, which captures the degree to which this variable varies over time but not cross-sectionally. This measure is a reasonable way to compare any possible trend break at the passage of the ACA to the normal time-series ‡uctuations of labor market variables.
E¤ects on Employment
Column 1 presents estimates for the trend break in total employment, with the baseline estimates in Row 1. We see that the trend break in total year-on-year employment growth was 0.3, suggesting that, if In Rows 5 and 6 of Table I , I consider whether counties in states that expanded Medicaid had a di¤erent trend break than counties in states that did not. For both groups of counties, the trend break is similar in magnitude to the baseline speci…cation and statistically signi…cant at least at 10%. Therefore, it does not appear that the greater employment growth in high-uninsurance counties is driven by either the states that expanded Medicaid or the states that did not.
Comparing the trend breaks in the regressions in Rows 5 and 6 of Table I is not a test of whether expanding Medicaid increased or decreased employment growth because the Medicaid expansion decision was not randomly assigned to states, and therefore, to counties. Instead, I exploit the fact that many states that expanded Medicaid share borders with states that didn't. As it is unlikely that states chose to expand or not expand Medicaid based on the economic conditions of counties on their borders, estimating the e¤ect of Medicaid expansion by comparing outcomes within pairs of counties that border each other but di¤er in whether their state expanded Medicaid sidesteps many of the endogeneity problems that would arise under a direct comparison of counties expanding Medicaid with counties that don't. Column 1, Row 7 of Table I presents trend break estimates for the resulting speci…cation, which is speci…cation (4) from Section 4. The size of the trend break for employment suggests that counties expanding Medicaid had employment growth that was higher by 1.76 percentage points (although this estimate is statistically signi…cant only at 10%). 
Other Labor Market Variables
In order to try to understand the mechanisms through which the ACA may have increased employment in spite of its potentially distortionary e¤ects, I analyze the e¤ects of the ACA on other labor market variables. As most of the estimates to be discussed will not be statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, almost all of the subsequent analysis is more speculative than the preceding section.
First, I consider how the ACA may have had di¤erent e¤ects on employment by type of industry. It is well-known that …rms are much more likely to o¤er insurance in some industries than in others. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports o¤er rates of employer-sponsored health insurance by …rst-digit NAICS industry.
On the basis of these o¤er rates, I de…ne "low-insurance industries" to be leisure and hospitality, as well as the aggregate "other services," which includes, for example, employment in laundromats and barbershops.
I de…ne all other industries as "high-insurance industries."
Columns 2 and 3 present estimates for trend breaks in employment growth in low-insurance industries and in high-insurance industries respectively. For rows 1-4, while none of the estimates are signi…cant, the trend break in low-insurance industries tends to be as large or larger as the trend break for employment growth as a whole (reported in Column 1), while the trend break for employment growth in high-insurance industries tends to be negative, or at least an order of magnitude less than the trend break for employment growth as a whole. Looking at Rows 5 and 6, we observe that this pattern is driven exclusively by the counties that are located in states that expanded Medicaid. Finally, in Row 7, we observe that this pattern is reversed when we look at the e¤ect of Medicaid expansion within pairs of bordering counties. This pattern of coe¢ cients (except in the border-time …xed e¤ects speci…cation) would be consistent with a story in which Medicaid expansion created incentives for people with a comparative advantage in low-insurance industries (for instance, the restaurant and hospitality industries) to reenter the labor force because their wages might still place them below the expanded Medicaid eligibility threshold. It goes without saying, however, that it could be consistent with multiple other stories (for example, people from high-insurance industries moving into low-insurance industries, or simply that low-insurance industries might expand more from the demand shock that would follow the wealth e¤ect that moderate-income people might experience after they get subsidized insurance), and that the empirical framework cannot distinguish between these stories.
Column 4 presents estimates for the trend break in log average salaries. For most of the speci…cations in question it is positive (suggesting that salaries rose in high-uninsurance counties relative to low-uninsurance counties and to trend after the implementation of the ACA), statistically signi…cant, and on the order of magnitude of 0.15 percentage points. This …nding would be consistent with the ACA increasing the marginal product of labor of people who are employed, or with a change in the composition of the employment pool in which more productive individuals enter and less productive individuals exit. The exception is the bordering counties speci…cation (Row 7 of Table I ), in which the e¤ect of Medicaid expansion on average salaries is strongly negative. This …nding could be explained by people who might qualify for Medicaid under the ACA moving from the non-expanding to the expanding county, increasing its employment but also decreasing its average productivity, and therefore, average salaries.
Columns 5 and 6 present estimates of trend breaks in log average salaries in low-and high-insurance industries respectively. The trend break for average salaries in low-insurance industries is almost always negative (though insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero), while the trend break for average salaries in highinsurance industries is almost always positive (and sometimes statistically signi…cant at 10%). This pattern is consistent with a forward shift in relative supply in low-insurance industries relative to high-insurance industries, which would be consistent with an alleviation of job lock (although the presence of this pattern does notl constitute causal evidence for this story). The exception is, as usual, the border …xed-e¤ects speci…cation, in which both trend breaks are negative, with the trend break for log average salaries in high-insurance industries much larger in magnitude.
Based on the speci…cations analyzing the e¤ects of the implementation of the entire ACA (rows 1 through 6), a consistent story would involve the ACA relaxing job lock and decreasing barriers for people to move from high-insurance industries to low-insurance industries, as well as incentivizing people who can earn relatively little in the labor market to engage in work without having to forgo Medicaid coverage. It appears that a di¤erent model is operating for the e¤ects of the Medicaid expansion in the presence of neighboring counties that do not expand Medicaid. Some of the estimates observed from that speci…cation can be rationalized if people who earn relatively little tend move from counties that do not expand Medicaid into counties that expand Medicaid (which would be di¢ cult to check in an intercensal year), entering the employment pool in the expanding county but decreasing its average salary. However, the breakdown of the trend breaks by industry in the border-time …xed e¤ects speci…cation remains an anomaly. As the speci…cation is estimated on the basis of only 247 county-pairs, part of the explanation for the anomalous results may come from the idiosyncracies of the sample.
Results for the Enactment of the ACA in 2010
While the enactment of the ACA changed few regulations that pertained to the labor market, many observers were concerned that it had created an anticipation e¤ect of higher marginal implicit tax rates on labor supply, which would slow the recovery of the U.S. economy from the Great Recession. To address these concerns, I can use the same regression framework to look at the trend break in the di¤erence of log employment between high-uninsurance and low-uninsurance counties in 2010, the year in which the ACA was enacted.
The interpretation of the results from this regression will be somewhat di¤erent from that of the regression assessing the impact of the implementation of the ACA. While the previous regression looked at quarterly data over a period of three years, during which it would be di¢ cult to argue that the structure of the economy could have quickly changed in high-uninsurance counties relative to low-uninsurance counties for reasons beside the enactment of the ACA (or the expiration of the EUC), this regression looks at annual data over the period before the Great Recession, the Great Recession itself, and the recovery period up to 2013. While this long scope is necessary to assess how the response to ACA enactment may have developed over the course of the recovery, it also complicates attributing all of the change in the employment di¤erential between high-and low-uninsurance counties to the ACA. These counties were likely structurally di¤erent before the Great Recession, had a di¤erent experience during the recession, and had a di¤erent recovery for reasons quite di¤erent from the ACA. Still, running this regression should inform us whether any anticipation e¤ects of ACA enactment could have been large enough to decrease employment in high-relative to lowuninsurance counties, or whether they were overwhelmed by other economic e¤ects increasing employment in these counties. Table II shows the trend break estimates from speci…cation (1) although it appears to be slightly higher in the former. Average salaries also grow in high-uninsurance counties relative to low-uninsurance counties, but the trend break is not statistically signi…cant. Finally, there is no consistent pattern for how average salaries in low-insurance industries evolve relative to average salaries in low-insurance industries. Figure 7 presents the graph of the coe¢ cients t for employment growth in the baseline speci…cation (Row 1) and Figure 8 presents the same graph for the speci…cation with the county trends and state-year …xed e¤ects (Row 2). We see that for the baseline speci…cation, there is a clear trend break in the employment growth di¤erential in 2010, with the di¤erential contracting during the Great Recession, but expanding after the enactment of the ACA. For the speci…cation with county trends and state-year …xed e¤ects, the pattern is even starker, with much of the pre-trend coming from the recession being absorbed by the additional controls, yielding a ‡at path of the di¤erential before the ACA enactment.
State-Level Results
It is interesting to examine the evolution of other variables besides employment, such as output, parttime employment and insurance premiums. Unfortunately, these variables tend to only be available at the state level at annual frequency. Therefore, in Table III, I presents results for how these variables evolved after the enactment of the ACA in 2010. The speci…cation and the robustness checks are the same as in Table   II , but all the data is now at the state level, rather than at the county level. (Therefore, in Row 2, instead of county trends and state-year …xed e¤ects I include state-speci…c linear and quadratic time trends). The …rst column presents results for employment, which are the same as in Column 1 of Table II . The second two columns consider changes in employment for …rms with fewer than 100 employees ("small …rms") and more than 100 employees ("large …rms"). We see that employment in both kinds of …rms increases in highuninsurance states relative to low-uninsurance states after 2010, but the increase is about twice as large (and statistically signi…cant) for employment in large …rms. This pattern would be consistent with the ACA discouraging employment at small …rms because of the concern about the employer mandate. However, in Row 4 of the table, we see that this pattern is driven by the Southwest, and if it is removed, employment at both types of …rms exhibits a statistically signi…cant positive trend break in 2010 of a similar magnitude.
Column 4 presents estimates for the trend break in gross state product per capita. Gross state product appears to have grown faster in high-uninsurance states than in low-uninsurance states after 2010 relative to the preceding trend, in much the same way as did employment. …nd that more exposed states and counties have, if anything, experienced a rise in employment, salaries and output relative to less exposed areas with the implementation or the enactment of the ACA, and that the data are consistent with a relative supply shift in favor of low-insurance industries. I also observe that if the ACA had generated an adverse anticipation e¤ect on labor markets at passage, it was overwhelmed by other forces making high-uninsurance states and counties grow faster. I also …nd that the premium distribution has become more compressed, and slightly lower on average.
I conclude that it is unlikely that the ACA had adverse labor market impacts in its …rst year, and that it did not substantially impede the recovery after the Great Recession. However, this should not be taken as a blanket statement that the ACA has improved the labor market, let alone that the welfare impacts of the ACA have been positive overall. First, major parts of the ACA, such as the employer mandate and the tax on high-premium plans (the Cadillac tax) still have yet to come into force. Second, this analysis does not directly assess the CBO's projection of the labor market impact of the ACA because the latter considers the period after 2016, by which time the employer mandate will have come in force. Moreover, the extent to which the Medicaid expansion, employer …nes and subsidies act as wedges may change drastically if health care spending begins to grow faster than the economy as a whole, as it had been on average for the past …ve decades. Finally, the ACA's e¤ect on the labor market is not the only, or even the main e¤ect on 14 welfare that it may have. While it is heartening that the ACA does not appear to have substantially slowed the recovery or hurt it in its …rst year of implementation, its long-run impact on the U.S. economy remains to be seen. Figure 1 (1) Note: See Table I for data de…nitions. This is a plot of the coe¢ cients t from speci…cation (1) Figure 5 (5) Note: See Table I for data de…nitions. This is a plot of the coe¢ cients t from speci…cation (1) Table I for data de…nitions. This is a plot of the coe¢ cients t from speci…cation (4) Table II for data de…nitions. This is a plot of the coe¢ cients t from speci…cation (1) Figure 8 (8) 
